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This paper considers the \negotiation game" (Busch and Wen [4]) which
combines the features of two-person alternating o®ers bargaining and re-
peated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in
general admits a large number of equilibria some of which involve delay
and ine±ciency. In order to isolate equilibria in this game, we investigate
the role of complexity of implementing a strategy, introduced in the liter-
ature on repeated games played by automata. It turns out that when the
players care for less complex strategies (at the margin) only e±cient equi-
libria survive. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may o®er an
explanation for co-operation and e±ciency in repeated games.
JEL Classi¯cation: C72, C78
Keywords: Negotiation Game, Repeated Game, Bargaining, Complexity,
Bounded Rationality, Automaton
1 Introduction
Busch and Wen [4], henceforth referred to as BW, analyze the following game.
In each period, two players bargain - in Rubinstein's alternating-o®ers protocol -
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1over the distribution of a ¯xed and commonly known periodic surplus. If an o®er
is accepted, the game ends and each player gets his share of the surplus according
to the agreement at every period thereafter. After any rejection, but before the
game moves to the next period, the players engage in a normal form game to
determine their payo®s for the period. The Pareto frontier of the disagreement
game is contained in the bargaining frontier. We shall refer to this game as the
negotiation game.
The negotiation game generally admits a large number of subgame-perfect
equilibria, as summarized by BW in a result that has a same °avour as the Folk
theorem in repeated games. The structure of the disagreement game determines
what can be sustained as credible threats in the negotiation game and thus shapes
the lowest possible subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) payo® for each player. BW
then show that, provided the players are su±ciently patient, any payo® vector
consistent with these payo®s can be supported as a SPE outcome in the negotiation
game. Moreover, one can construct a pair of equilibrium strategies that generate
any length of delay in reaching an agreement as well as a sequence of ine±cient
actions taken after disagreements. The negotiation game has a unique (e±cient)
equilibrium only in the degenerate case in which any Nash equilibrium payo® of
the disagreement game coincides with its minmax point.
The negotiation game and its equilibria can be interpreted from two alternative
viewpoints. Naturally, we can think of the game as a standard alternating-o®ers
bargaining game with endogenous disagreement payo®s.1 In fact, Fernandez and
Glazer [7] (and also Haller and Holden [11]) derive much of the insights in a
well-known application of the game along this bargaining interpretation. They
consider the stando® between a union and a ¯rm. During a contract renewal pro-
cess, a union and a ¯rm renegotiate over the distribution of a periodic revenue,
but a disagreement puts them in a strategic situation. The union can either accept
the ¯rm's wage o®er or forego the status quo wage for one period and strike be-
fore making a counter-o®er next period. (The ¯rm is inactive in the disagreement
game.) Fernandez and Glazer's characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria in
this speci¯c setting contains many of the salient features of the equilibria in the
general game, and thus, o®ers an explanation as to why such socially wasteful
activities as strikes may take place even in a situation where the agents are com-
pletely rational and fully informed.
The alternative viewpoint focuses on the repeated game aspect of the nego-
tiation game (and this is the interpretation we want to emphasize in the paper).
Real world repeated interactions are often accompanied by negotiations which
1The issue of endogenous disagreement payo®s in a bargaining situation goes back at least
to Nash [14] who considers the problem in a co-operative framework.
2can lead to mutual agreement. While equilibria in standard repeated games are
usually given the interpretation of implicit, self-enforcing agreements, the situa-
tions depicted by the negotiation game are associated with explicit contracts that
can bind the players to a particular set of outcomes. For example, we observe
¯rms engaged in a repeated horizontal or vertical relationship negotiating over a
long-term contract, or even a merger. Similarly, countries involved in international
trade often attempt to settle an agreement that enforces ¯xed quotas and tari®s.
The Folk theorem gives economic theorists little hope of making any predic-
tions in repeated interactions. However, as the aforementioned examples suggest,
it seems that negotiation is often a salient feature of real world repeated interac-
tions, presumably to enforce co-operation and e±cient outcomes. Can bargaining
be used to isolate equilibria in repeated games? Unfortunately, the contributions
of BW and others demonstrate that Folk theorem type results with a large num-
ber of equilibria which involve delay and ine±ciency may persist even when the
players are endowed with an opportunity at the beginning of each period to settle
on the e±cient outcome once and for all.
In order to enrich this line of enquiry, on the issue of how bargaining can be
used to select (e±cient) equilibria in repeated games, this paper departs from the
standard rationality paradigm and introduces the notion of complexity into the
negotiation game. Our central message is that the equilibrium strategies support-
ing ine±cient outcomes in this game are unnecessarily too complex to implement.
Bargaining combined with the players' preference for less complex strategies (at
the margin) select only e±cient outcomes in the repeated game.
There are many di®erent ways of de¯ning the complexity of a strategy. In
the literature on repeated games played by automata the number of states of the
machine is often used as a measure of complexity (Rubinstein [20], Abreu and
Rubinstein [1], Piccione [17] and Piccione and Rubinstein [18]). This is because
the set of states of the machine can be regarded as a partition of possible histo-
ries. In particular, Kalai and Stanford [13] show that the counting-states measure
of complexity, henceforth referred to as state complexity, is equivalent to looking
at at the number of continuation strategies that the strategy induces at di®erent
histories of the game. We extend this notion of strategic complexity to the ne-
gotiation game, and facilitate the analysis by considering an equivalent \machine
game".
The alternating-o®ers bargaining imposes an asymmetric structure on the ne-
gotiation game which is stationary only every two periods (henceforth we shall
refer to every two periods as a \stage"). To account for such structural asymme-
try of the game, we shall adopt machine speci¯cations that formally distinguish
between the di®erent roles played by each player in a given stage. A player can
be either proposer or responder. In the main machine speci¯cation used in the
3analysis, there are two \sub-machines", each playing a role (of a proposer or a re-
sponder) with distinct states, output and transition functions. Transition occurs
at the end of each period, from a state belonging to one sub-machine to a state
belonging to the other sub-machine as roles are reversed.
We ¯rst demonstrate that the result of Kalai and Stanford [13] holds for our
speci¯cation of machines. The total number of states used by each sub-machine
under this speci¯cation is equivalent to measuring the total number of continuation
strategies that the implemented strategy induces at the beginning of each period.
The concept of Nash equilibrium is then re¯ned to incorporate the players'
preference for less complex strategies. In our choice of equilibrium notions, com-
plexity enters a player's preferences, together with the payo®s in the underlying
game, either lexicographically or as a positive ¯xed cost c. The larger this cost
is, the more is required of complexity. We can thus interpret it as a measure of
the players' \bounded rationality". We will refer to a Nash equilibrium (of the
machine game) with ¯xed complexity cost c by NEMc and adopt the convention
of using c = 0 (and thus NEM0) to refer to the lexicographic case. We also in-
voke the notion of subgame-perfection and consider the set of NEMc that are
subgame-perfect, referred to as SPEMc.
The selection result is as follows. We ¯rst show that, independently of the
degree of complexity cost and discount factor, if an agreement occurs in some ¯nite
period as the outcome of some NEMc then it must occur within the very ¯rst stage
of the game, and moreover, the players' equilibrium strategies must be stationary
(history-independent). Since any stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in the
negotiation game is e±cient (see BW), it then follows that the set of SPEMc
inducing an agreement must be e±cient.
We then consider the other possible outcome, one in which there is perpetual
disagreement. Here the following set of results are shown for a discount factor
arbitrarily close to one. We ¯rst show that, given any non-negative complexity
cost, every SPEMc involving perpetual disagreement is at least long-run (almost)
e±cient; that is, the players must reach a ¯nite period in which the continuation
game then on is (almost) e±cient. It follows that, in cases where all disagree-
ment game outcomes are ine±cient, delay cannot persist inde¯nitely under any
SPEMc. In fact, if we assume a strictly positive complexity cost, then we also de-
rive that perpetual disagreement is not consistent with SPEMc however small that
complexity cost is (even when agreement only weakly dominates disagreement).
Combined with the previous set of results on agreement, this implies a very strong
prediction for the case in which players are su±ciently patient. For any c > 0 (or
if c = 0 and agreement strictly dominates disagreement), every SPEMc of the
negotiation game must be e±cient such that an agreement is reached in the ¯rst
stage and the associated strategies are stationary.
4We also explore an alternative machine speci¯cation that employs more fre-
quent transitions and hence account for ¯ner partitions of histories and continua-
tion strategies. This machine consists of four sub-machines; while keeping the role
distinction, transition occurs twice in each period at the end of bargaining and
at the end of the disagreement game. We obtain sharper results in this case. The
results on perpetual disagreement do not depend on the discount factor.
Our contribution thus takes the study of complexity in repeated games a step
further from the aforementioned literature in which complexity has yielded only
a limited selective power. (See also Bloise [3] who shows robust examples of two-
player repeated games in which the set of Nash equilibria with complexity costs co-
incides with the set of individually rational payo®s.) This paper demonstrates that
complexity and bargaining in tandem may o®er an explanation for co-operation
and e±ciency in repeated games.
There have been extensive and wide-ranging approaches at restricting the un-
wieldily large set of equilibria resulting from the Folk theorem. Among these
attempts, one literature motivates the notion of bargaining and negotiation by
invoking the idea that punishments that are ine±cient may be vulnerable to rene-
gotiation and hence not credible. This literature suggests a solution concept based
on renegotiation-proofness.2 This line of research takes a \black box" approach to
renegotiation. Unlike in the negotiation game, the process of (re)negotiation is
not explicitly modelled; rather, the renegotiation arguments are embedded in the
additional restrictions imposed on an equilibrium.
We also want to mention several recent papers that have rekindled the issue
of complexity in equilibrium selection, and in particular, demonstrated that com-
plexity drives e±cient outcomes in some speci¯c games. Chatterjee and Sabourian
[5][6] consider the multi-person Rubinstein bargaining game, and Sabourian [21],
Gale and Sabourian [9][10] consider market games with matching and bargaining.
(These papers are also interested in other issues such as the uniqueness of the
equilibrium set and the competitive nature of equilibria in the case of the mar-
ket games.) In contrast to the present paper, however, these papers build upon a
di®erent notion of strategic complexity. They consider the complexity of response
rules within a period. A simple response rule according to their notion of response
complexity uses only the information available in the current period and not the
history of play up to the period. Introducing this (together with state complexity
in Sabourian [21]) delivers the e±ciency results in those games.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we describe the
negotiation game and BW's main results. We then introduce the notion of com-
2There are in fact many competing proposals of the concept with largely di®erent predictions.
See Pearce [16] and Chapter 5.4 of Fudenberg and Tirole [8] for a survey.
5plexity in terms of strategies and machines. The machine game will be described.
Section 4 presents the main analysis and results. We then run the analogous re-
sults with an alternative, more elaborate machine speci¯cation in Section 5. We
¯nally conclude. The appendices contain some relegated proofs and also explains
that the equilibrium concept we use closely parallels that of Abreu and Rubinstein
[1].
2 The Negotiation Game
Let us formally describe the negotiation game, as de¯ned by BW. There are two
players indexed by i = 1;2. In the alternating-o®ers protocol, each player in turn
proposes a partition of a periodic surplus whose value is normalized to one. If the
o®er is accepted, the game ends and the players share the surplus accordingly at
every period thereafter. If the o®er is rejected, the players engage in a one-shot
game, called the \disagreement game", before moving onto the next period in
which the rejecting player makes a counter-o®er.
We index the (potentially in¯nite) time periods by t = 1;2;::: and adopt the
convention that player 1 makes o®ers in odd periods and player 2 makes o®ers
in even periods. Let 42 ´ fx = (x1;x2) j
P
i xi = 1g be a partition of the unit
periodic surplus. A period then refers to a single o®er x 2 42 by one player, a
response made by the other player - acceptance \Y " or rejection \N" - and the
play of the disagreement game if the response is rejection. The common discount
factor is ± 2 (0;1).
The disagreement game is a two-player normal form game, de¯ned as G =
fA1;A2;u1(¢);u2(¢)g. Ai is the set of player i's actions and ui(¢) : A1 £ A2 ! R is
his payo® function in the disagreement game. We shall denote the set of outcomes
in G by A = A1 £ A2 with its element indexed by a.3 De¯ne u(¢) : A ! R2 and
assume that it is bounded. Each player's minmax payo® is normalized to zero.
Also, we assume that for any a 2 A
u1(a) + u2(a) · 1
Agreement weakly dominates disagreement. Thus, the bargaining o®ers the players
an opportunity to settle on the e±cient outcome once and for all.
Two types of outcome paths are possible in the negotiation game; one in which
an agreement occurs in a ¯nite time, and one in which disagreement continues
perpetually. Let T denote the end of the negotiation game and at the disagreement
3The normal form may involve sequential moves. In this case, Ai will represent player i's set
of strategies, rather than actions, in the disagreement game.
6game outcome in period t < T. If T = 1, we mean an outcome path in which








If T < 1, denote the agreed partition in T by z = (z1;z2) 2 42. Player i's payo®











The negotiation game is stationary only every two periods (beginning with an
odd one) or \stage". In specifying the players' strategies (and later machines),
we shall formally distinguish between the di®erent roles played by each player
in each stage game. He can be either the proposer (p) or the responder (r) in a
given period. We shall index a player's role by k. The role distinction provides a
natural framework to capture the structural asymmetry that the alternating o®ers
bargaining imposes on the repeated (disagreement) game.
In order to de¯ne a strategy, we ¯rst need to introduce some further notations.
We shall use the following notational convention. Whenever superscripts/subscripts
i and j both appear in the same exposition, we mean i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j. Simi-
larly, whenever we use superscrpts/subscripts k and l together, we mean k;l = p;r
and k 6= l.
We shall denote a history of outcomes in a period by e, and this belongs to
the set E = f(xi;Y );(xi;N;a)gxi242;a2A;i=1;2 where the superscript i represents
the identity of the proposer in the period. Let et be the outcome of the period t.
We also need notation to represent information available to a player within a
period when it is his turn to take an action given his role. To this end, we de¯ne a





For example, the null set here refers to the beginning of a period at which the
proposer has to make an o®er; (xi;N) represents a partial history of an o®er by
player i followed by the other player's rejection.
Also, let us de¯ne








We denote the set of actions available to player i in the negotiation game by
Ci ´ 4
2 [ Y [ N [ Ai :
Let us denote by Cik(d) the set of actions available to player i given his role k and
a corresponding partial history d 2 Dik. Thus, we have
Cip(d) =
½
¢2 if d = ;




fY;Ng if d = xj
Ai if d = (xj;N)
Let
H
t = E £ ¢¢¢ £ E | {z }
t times
be the set of all possible histories of outcomes over t periods in the negotiation
game, excluding those that have resulted in an agreement. The initial history is
empty (trivial) and denoted by H1 = ;. H1 ´ [1
t=1Ht denotes the set of all
possible ¯nite period histories.
For the analysis, we shall divide H1 into two smaller subsets according to the
di®erent roles that the players play in each stage. Let Ht
ik be the set of all possible
histories of outcomes over t periods after which player i's role is k. Notice that
Ht
ik = Ht
jl. Also, let H1
ik = [1
t=1Ht
ik. Thus, the set of all possible periodic histories
of the negotiation game can be written as H1 = H1
ip [ H1
ir (i = 1;2).
A strategy for player i is then a function
fi : (H
1
ip £ Dip) [ (H
1
ir £ Dir) ! Ci
such that for any (h;d) 2 H1
ik £ Dik we have fi(h;d) 2 Cik(d): The set of all
strategies for player i is denoted by Fi.
We can de¯ne a stationary (or history-independent) strategy in the following
way.
De¯nition 1 A strategy fi is stationary if and only if fi(h;d) = fi(h0;d) 8h;h0 2
H1
ik and 8d 2 Dik for k = p;r. A strategy pro¯le f = (fi;f¡i) is stationary if fi
is stationary for all i.
8The behavior induced by such a strategy may depend on the partial history
within the current period but not on the history of the game up to the period.
Notice also that a stationary strategy pro¯le always induces the same outcome in
each stage of the game.
In the spirit of the Folk theorem, BW characterize the set of subgame-perfect
equilibrium (SPE) payo®s of the above game. BW, to this end, compute the lower














which BW assume to be well-de¯ned. Note also that wi · 1 given the assumption
that u(a) · 1 8a 2 A, and wi ¸ 0 if G has at least one Nash equilibrium (given
the minmax point). Then, the in¯mum of player i's SPE payo®s in the negotiation










BW show that, provided the players are su±ciently patient, these exists a SPE of
the negotiation game (beginning with i's o®er) in which the players obtain these
lower bounds.








We are now ready to formally recite the key results of BW below.
BW Result 1 For any payo® vector (v1;v2) of the negotiation game such that
v1 ¸ v1 and v2 ¸ v2, 9 ¹ ± 2 (0;1) such that 8± 2 (¹ ±;1) (v1;v2) is a SPE payo®
vector of the negotiation game with discount factor ±.
This is BW's main Theorem. Several comments are due. First, many outcome
paths are possible to support a feasible payo® vector in equilibrium, some of which
will involve delays, and moreover, ine±cient disagreement game outcomes before
agreement. Perpetual disagreement is also possible.
9Second, notice that what determines the nature of equilibria in the negotiation
game is the structure of the disagreement game, and not the discount factor or
the bargaining surplus available. In particular, the negotiation game will admit
a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium only if w1 = w2 = 0 which implies that
any Nash equilibrium payo® vector of the disagreement game has to coincide with
its minmax point. Thus, in general, the negotiation game will have a continuum
of equilibria much in the way the Folk theorem characterizes the repeated game
(even when the disagreement game payo®s are always uniformly small relative to
agreement). Nonetheless the forces of bargaining still restrict the set of feasible
equilibrium payo®s in the negotiation game substantially compared to the set of
individually rational payo®s in the disagreement (repeated) game.
Another relevant result of BW concerns stationary strategies. For a pair of
stationary strategies to constitute a SPE of the negotiation game, only a Nash
equilibrium of the disagreement game can be played after a rejection; otherwise,
there will be a pro¯table deviation for some player. We can thus analyze the ne-
gotiation game as if there is a ¯xed sequence of disagreement game plays, and
consequently, the Rubinstein [19] bargaining result carries over. When we hence-
forth refer to an equilibrium as being e±cient, we mean that its outcome is such
that either an agreement takes place immediately in the ¯rst period or otherwise
the disagreement payo®s sum up to one in every period up to agreement. The
following puts together Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 of BW.
BW Result 2 If G has a Nash equilibrium, denoted by a¤ 2 A, then the negotia-
tion game has a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the strategies are stationary
and player 1's o®er z = (z1;z2) 2 42 such that
z1 =
1 + ±u1 (a¤) ¡ u2 (a¤)
1 + ±
is accepted immediately. Any other stationary SPE is e±cient.
Thus, any stationary SPE of the negotiation game, if exists (which is guar-
anteed if the disagreement game has at least one Nash equilibrium), must be
e±cient. Delay is possible (either over one period or inde¯nitely), but then the
Nash equilibrium payo®s must be e±cient, i.e.
P
i ui(a¤) = 1, such that the players
are always indi®erent between agreement and delay of one period. Note also that
if the disagreement game has multiple Nash equilibria there can be many di®er-
ent (but all e±cient) payo® distributions that will support the above equilibrium
outcome of the negotiation game.
103 Complexity, Machines, and Equilibrium
There are many alternative ways to think of the \complexity" of a strategy in
dynamic games. One natural and intuitive way to measure strategic complexity,
which we shall adopt in the paper, is to consider the total number of distinct
continuation strategies that the strategy induces at di®erent histories (Kalai and
Stanford [13]).
In a repeated game, it is natural to take the measure over all its possible
subgames. In the negotiation game, each stage game is sequential and this means
that we can have several di®erent measures of complexity this way. For instance, we
can take all possible subgames at the beginning of each period of the negotiation
game to correspond with our de¯nition of periodic histories Ht. Let fijh be a
continuation strategy at history h 2 H1 induced by fi 2 Fi. Thus,
fijh(h
0;d) = fi(h;h
0;d) for any (h;h
0;d) 2 H
1
ik £ Dik for any k :
Also, let us de¯ne the set of all such continuation strategies by Fi(fi) = ffijh : h 2
H1g. Then the cardinality of this set provides a measure of strategic complexity.
Let us call it comp(fi).
The set of continuation strategies can also be divided into smaller sets ac-
cording to the role speci¯cation. De¯ne Fik(fi) = ffijh : h 2 H1
ik g. We have
Fi(fi) = [kFik(fi). Complexity can then be equivalently measured by comp(fi) = P
k jFik(fi)j. We can also measure complexity over ¯ner partitions of histories and
corresponding continuation strategies. As we shall see, the precise de¯nition of
complexity is going to play some role in shaping the results.
In dynamic games any strategy can be implemented by an automaton or a
\machine" (we shall clarify this statement below). Moreover, Kalai and Stanford
[13] show that in repeated games the above notion of complexity of a strategy
(the number of continuation strategies) is equivalent to counting the number of
states of the (smallest) automaton that implements the strategy. Thus, one could
equivalently describe any result either in terms of underlying strategies and their
complexity (comp(¢)) or in terms of machines and their number of states.
We shall establish below that this equivalence between the two representa-
tions of strategic complexity also holds in the negotiation game. Our approach to
complexity will then be facilitated in machine terms as this will provide a more
economical platform to present the analysis of complexity. Each player's strategy
space in the negotiation game will be taken as the set of all machines and the
players simultaneously and independently choose a single machine at the begin-
ning of the negotiation game. This is the \machine game", a term which we shall
interchangeably use with the negotiation game.
11Since each stage game of the negotiation game has a sequential structure, many
di®erent machine speci¯cations are possible to equivalently represent a strategy.
(The same is also the case in other sequential dynamic games; see Piccione and
Rubinstein [18], Chatterjee and Sabourian [5][6] and Sabourian [21]). The fact
that the stage game is also asymmetric across its two periods - a player switches
his role in the bargaining process - adds to this issue of multiple possible machine
speci¯cations.
In this paper, we present two particular machine speci¯cations. We choose to
run the analysis ¯rst with the simpler of the two. The results are in fact sharper un-
der the other speci¯cation, but our chosen order of analysis will serve to strengthen
the expositional °ow. As we shall see later, counting the number of states for these
machines corresponds precisely to the manner in which we divide the histories and
accordingly de¯ne the notion of complexity in terms of (continuation) strategies.
The following de¯nes a machine that employs two \sub-machines".
De¯nition 2 (Two sub-machine (2SM) speci¯cation) A machine (automa-
ton), Mi = fMip;Mirg, consists of two sub-machines Mip = (Qip;q1
ip;¸ip;¹ip) and
Mir = (Qir;q1
ir;¸il;¹il) where for any k;l = p;r
Qik is the set of states;
q
1
ik is the initial state belonging to Qik;
¸ik : Qik £ Dik ! Ci is the output function such that
¸ik(qik;d) 2 Cik(d); 8qik 2 Qik and 8d 2 Dik; and
¹ik : Qik £ E ! Qil is the transition function.
Each sub-machine in the above de¯nition of a machine consists of a set of
distinct states, an initial state and an output function enabling a player to play
a given role. Transitions take place at the end of each period from a state in one
sub-machine to a state in the other sub-machine as roles are reversed each period.
We shall sometimes refer to a machine in the above de¯nition simply as a 2SM.
We shall assume that each sub-machine has to have at least one state.4 But
notice that we do not assume ¯niteness of a machine; each sub-machine may have
any arbitrary (possibly in¯nite) number of states. This is in contrast to Abreu and
Rubinstein [1] and others who consider ¯nite automata. Assuming that machines
can only have a ¯nite number of states is itself a restriction on the players' choice
of strategies.
4We could also de¯ne a distinct terminal state for each sub-machine. This is immaterial. We
are assuming that if an o®er is accepted by the responder, Mi enters the terminal state of the
relevant sub-machine and shuts o®.
12Notice also that the initial state of the sub-machine that operates in the sec-
ond period is in fact redundant because the ¯rst state used by this sub-machine
depends on the transition function taking place between the ¯rst two periods of
the game (in terms of strategies, the continuation strategy from the second period
on can be contingent on what happens in the ¯rst period). Nevertheless, we endow
both sub-machines with an initial state for expositional ease.
We can now formally state what we mean by a machine implementing a strat-
egy in the negotiation game. Consider a machine Mi = fMip;Mirg where, for
k = p;r, Mik = (Qik;q1
ik;¸ik;¹ik). For every k = p;r and for any h 2 H1
ik , denote
the state at history h by qi(h) 2 Qik. Formally if h = (e1;:::;et¡1) then qi(h) = qt
i
where for any 0 · ¿ · t; q¿






ik if i is in role k initially at t = 1
q1
il if i is in role l initially at t = 1







i ;e¿¡1) if i is in role k at ¿
¹ik(q
¿¡1
i ;e¿¡1) if i is in role l at ¿
De¯nition 3 Mi implements fi if 8k, 8h 2 H1
ik and d 2 Dik
¸ik(q(h);d) = fi(h;d)
where q(h) is de¯ned inductively as above.
The following de¯nes a minimal machine.
De¯nition 4 A machine is minimal if and only if each of its sub-machines has
exactly one state.
A minimal 2SM implements the same actions in every period regardless of
the history of the preceding periods, provided that the partial history within the
current period (given a role) is the same. Hence, it corresponds to a stationary
strategy as in De¯nition 1.
We have thus far established that machines and strategies are equivalent in the
negotiation game. Now let us formally show that comp(fi) is equivalent to counting
the total number of states of the machine that implements the strategy fi. It must
be stressed here that the exact speci¯cation of a machine is important in qualifying
this statement. Since in de¯ning comp(fi) we take continuation strategies at the
beginning of each period, we need transitions to take place between periods in
13accordance with the continuation points chosen. It is also important that each
sub-machine uses its own distinct set of states.
Let kMik =
P
k jQikj be the total number of states (or size) of machine Mi
in the 2SM speci¯cation. The cardinality of the set of continuation strategies
that a strategy induces at the beginning of each period of the negotiation game
corresponds to the size of the smallest 2SM implementing the strategy.
Proposition 1 For every fi 2 Fi let ©(fi) be the set of 2SMs that implement fi.
Also, let ¹ Mi = f ¹ Mip; ¹ Mirg be such that




i 2 ©(fi)g :
Then, we have jFik(fi)j = k ¹ Mikk for any k = p;r and thus k ¹ Mik = comp(fi).
Proof. The proof is a direct application of the proof of Theorem 1 in Kalai
and Stanford [13]. For ease of exposition, it is relegated to Appendix A. k
Given this result, we now formally de¯ne the notion of complexity in terms of
machines, as adopted in the literature on repeated games played by automata µ a
la Rubinstein [20] and Abreu and Rubinstein [1].5
De¯nition 5 (State complexity) A machine M0
i is more complex than another
machine Mi, or M0
i Â Mi, if kM0
ik > kMik. Also, we say that M0
i is at least
complex as Mi, or M0
i º Mi, if kM0
ik ¸ kMik.
To wrap up the description of the machine game, let us ¯x some more no-
tational conventions. Let M = (M1;M2) be a machine pro¯le. There are several
variables that will depend on the particular machine pro¯le chosen. Given the
machine pro¯le M, T(M) is the end of the negotiation game; z(M) 2 42 is the
agreement o®er if T(M) < 1; at(M) is the disagreement game outcome in period
t < T(M); and qt
i(M) is the state of player i's (sub-)machine appearing in period
t · T(M) induced by M.
5We also draw attention to the work of Binmore, Piccione, and Samuelson [2] who propose
another notion of complexity similar to state complexity considered in this paper and others.
According to their \collapsing state condition", an automaton M1 is less complex than another
automaton M2 if the same implementation can be obtained by consolidating a collection of
states belonging to M2 into a single state in M1. It will not be di±cult to see that our results
will also hold under this scheme.
14Similarly, we denote by ¼t
i(M) player i's (discounted) average continuation





> > > > <
> > > > :
(1 ¡ ±)
P1
¿=t ±¿¡tui(a¿(M)) if T(M) = 1
(1 ¡ ±)
PT¡1
¿=t ±¿¡tui (a¿(M)) + ±T¡tzi(M) if t < T(M) < 1
zi(M) if t = T(M)
We shall use the abbreviation ¼1
i(M) = ¼i(M).
For ease of exposition, the argument in M will sometimes be dropped when
we refer to one of these variables that depends on the particular machine pro¯le,
e.g. ¼t
i ´ ¼t
i(M). Unless otherwise stated, the variable will refer to the pro¯le in
the claim.
We now introduce an equilibrium notion that captures the players' preference
for less complex strategies. There are several ways of re¯ning Nash equilibrium
with complexity. We choose an equilibrium notion in which complexity enters a
player's preferences after the payo®s and with a (non-negative) ¯xed cost c.6
To facilitate this concept, we ¯rst de¯ne the notion of ²-best response. (The
following de¯nition can equivalently refer to underlying strategies.)
De¯nition 6 For any ² ¸ 0, a machine Mi is a ²-best response to M¡i if, 8M0
i,
¼i(Mi;M¡i) + ² ¸ ¼i(M
0
i;M¡i) :
If a machine is a 0-best response, then it is a best response in the conventional
sense.
Using this, we de¯ne a NEMc.
De¯nition 7 A machine pro¯le M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) constitutes a Nash equilibrium
of the machine game with complexity cost c ¸ 0 (NEMc) if, 8i,
(i) M
¤
i is a best response to M
¤
¡i; and
(ii) There exists no M
0
i such that M
0







By de¯nition, the set of NEMc is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria in the
negotiation game. The case of zero complexity cost c = 0 is closest to the standard
equilibrium and corresponds to the case of lexicographic preferences. Any NEMc
with a positive complexity cost c > 0 must also be a NEMc with c = 0. The
6Sabourian [21] employs this equilibrium notion.
15magnitude of c therefore can be interpreted as a measure of how much the players
care for less complex strategies, or indeed the players' bounded rationality.
Abreu and Rubinstein [1], henceforth referred to as AR, propose a general way
of describing a player's preference ordering over machine pro¯les that is increasing
in his payo® of the game and decreasing in the complexity of his machine. A Nash
equilibrium can then be written in terms of machines that are most preferred
against each other. In contrast, our equilibrium concept directly ¯nds a subset
of Nash equilibria of the underlying game that ¯ts our complexity cost criterion
(at the margin). There is, however, an analytical parallel between our choice of
solution concept and that of AR because the latter must also be a Nash equilibrium
of the negotiation game (see Appendix B). Our complexity cost criterion can
be thought of as an alternative way to embed the trade-o® between payo® and
complexity that underlies AR's preference ordering.
NEMc strategy pro¯les are not necessarily credible however. We could intro-
duce credibility, as in Chatterjee and Sabourian [5][6], by introducing trembles
into the model and considering the limit of extensive form trembling hand equi-
librium (Nash equilibrium with independent trembles at each information set)
with complexity cost as the trembles become small. The noise will ensure that
strategies are optimal (allowing for complexity) after all histories that occur with
a positive probability.
A more direct, and simpler, way of introducing credibility would be to consider
NEMc strategy pro¯les that are subgame-perfect equilibria of the negotiation
game without complexity cost.
De¯nition 8 A machine pro¯le M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) constitutes a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the machine game with complexity cost c ¸ 0 (SPEMc) if M¤ is
both a NEMc and a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the negotiation game.
We shall denote by ­±(c) the set of SPEMc pro¯les in the negotiation game with
common discount factor ± when the complexity cost is c.
Given Proposition 1, we can equivalently de¯ne these notions of equilibrium
(NEMc and SPEMc) in terms of underlying strategies and the corresponding
measure of complexity comp(¢). As mentioned earlier, we prefer the machine game
analysis for its expositional economy.
4 Analysis: Complexity and E±ciency
4.1 Some Preliminary Results
In this sub-section, we lay out some Lemmas that will pave way for the main results
below. These results are derived independently of the magnitude of complexity
16cost.
We ¯rst state an obvious, yet very important, implication of the complexity
requirement. Every state belonging to the equilibrium machines has to appear on
the equilibrium path. If there is a state that does not appear on the equilibrium
path, it can be \dropped" to reduce complexity cost without a®ecting the outcome
and payo®.
Lemma 1 Assume that M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤









ik). Then, 8qi 2 Q¤
ik, 8i and
8k, there exists a period t such that qt
i(M¤) = qi.
Proof : Suppose not. So suppose that there exists some ¹ qi 2 Q¤
ik that does not
appear in any period t on the equilibrium path.











j ) = ¼i(M¤
i ;M¤
j ), and moreover, we have M¤
i Â M0
i. Hence,
we have contradiction against the assumption that M¤ is a NEMc pro¯le. k
A NEMc machine may have an in¯nite number of states. But, It follows from
Lemma 1 that:
Corollary 1 If M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEMc with c ¸ 0, then M¤
i (i = 1;2) must
have a countable number of states.
Next note that since any strategy can be implemented by a machine it follows
from its de¯nition that any NEMc pro¯le M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) corresponds to a Nash










More generally, the equilibrium machines must be best response (in terms of
payo®s) along the equilibrium path of the negotiation game. The following must
be the case:
Lemma 2 Assume that M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEMc with c ¸ 0. Then, 8i;j and















j) is the machine that is identical to M¤
j except that
it starts with the sub-machine which operates in period ¿ with the initial state q¿
j.
17Proof. Suppose not. Then, for some i and ¿ · T(M¤), there exists another


















ik). This machine is constructed in the
following way. Let qt
i 2 Q¤
ik denote the state of M¤
i appearing in period t (where
i is in role k). Also let et be the outcome in period t induced by M¤. For every











i;d) for all d 2 Dik :















t) = ¹ q
where ¹ q 2 ¹ Qik is another distinct state such that M0
i(¹ q) = ¹ Mi.
Thus, M0
i played against M¤




































But this contradicts (1) above. k
Now it follows that if a state belonging to a player's equilibrium machine
appears twice on the outcome path then the continuation payo® of the other
player must be identical at both periods.
Lemma 3 Assume that M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEMc with c ¸ 0. Then, 8i;j and














18Proof. This follows from Lemma 2. k
Using this information, we can show that if a state belonging to a player's
equilibrium machine appears on the outcome path for the ¯rst time, then the
state of the other player's machine in that period must also be appearing for the
¯rst time. This Lemma will provide a critical tool behind the derivation of some
of the main results below.
Lemma 4 Assume that M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEMc with c ¸ 0. Then, for any i













¤) 8t < ¿ :
Proof. Suppose not. So, there exists some i and some ¿ · T such that q¿
i 6= qt
i
8t < ¿ and q¿0
j = q¿
j for some ¿0 < ¿. Then, by Lemma 3, ¼¿
i = ¼¿0
i .
Consider player i using another machine M0
i = fM0
ip;M0






ik). This machine is identical to M¤
i except that:
² q¿
i is dropped; and
² the transition function is such that ¹0
ik(q
¿¡1
i ;e¿¡1) = q¿0
i (k 2 fp;rg).
To be precise, M0












² for every k0 = p;r, every qi 2 Q0






² for every k, every qi 2 Q0






and for every l, every qi 2 Q0











where e¿¡1 2 E is the outcome that M¤ generates in period ¿ ¡ 1.
19Since q¿
i appears for the ¯rst time in period ¿ on the original equilibrium path,
we cannot have q
¿¡1
i and e¿¡1 appearing together before ¿ ¡ 1. Otherwise, the
transition function of the equilibrium machine would induce q¿
i before ¿ which
contradicts our assumption of ¿.
Thus, playing M0
i against M¤
j does not alter the outcome path up to ¿. But
from ¿ onwards, the outcome path between ¿0 and ¿ ¡ 1 will repeat itself ad
in¯nitum.
This does not change i's payo® from the machine game (given M¤















































where the second equality follows from Lemma 3. The new machine also yields










































j ) and (M¤
i ;M¤
j ) induce the same outcome before ¿0, it follows
that ¼i(M0
i;M¤
j ) = ¼i(M¤
i ;M¤
j ). But then, since q¿
i is dropped, M¤
i Â M0
i. Thus,
we have contradiction against NEMc.7 k
7Notice that this result turns on the assumption that each sub-machine uses a distinct set of
states. If the sub-machines shared the states, we could not simply \drop" q¿
i since it could be
used for the other sub-machine (playing a di®erent role) before ¿0.
204.2 Agreement
In this sub-section, we shall show that, independently of c, if an agreement occurs
at some ¯nite period as a NEMc outcome, then it must occur within the very ¯rst
stage (two periods) of the negotiation game.
We can immediately state that if an agreement occurs within the ¯rst stage
as a NEMc outcome, then the associated equilibrium machines must be minimal,
and thus, the implemented strategies must be stationary.
Lemma 5 If M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEMc with c ¸ 0 and T(M¤) · 2, then
jQikj = 1 8i and 8k.
Proof : Suppose not. So, suppose that jQikj > 1 for some i and for some k.
But then, for this player i, dropping every state in his machine other than the two
states appearing the ¯rst and second periods leaves his payo® unchanged and yet
reduces complexity cost. Hence, we have contradiction against NEMc. k
Next we show that if a NEMc induces an agreement in a ¯nite period beyond
the ¯rst stage, it must be that the pair of states appearing in the ¯nal period are
distinct.
Lemma 6 Assume that M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEMc with c ¸ 0 and T(M¤) < 1.
Then, qt
i(M¤) 6= qT
i (M¤) 8t < T(M¤) and 8i.
Proof. Suppose not. So, suppose that qt
i = qT
i for some i and some t < T. Let
z = (z1;z2) 2 42 be the agreement at T. There are two possible cases to consider.
Case A: Player i is the proposer at T.
De¯ne ¿ = minftjqt
i = qT
i g. By Lemma 3, ¼¿
j = ¼T
j : Since there is an agreement
on z at T, we have ¼¿
j = zj.









jk). This machine is identical to M¤
j except that:
² q¿




² the transition function is such that ¹0
jp(q
¿¡1
j ;e¿¡1) = qT
j .
Since, by Lemma 4, q¿
j (as does q¿
i by de¯nition) appears for the ¯rst time at ¿
on the original equilibrium path, this new machine (given M¤
i ) generates an iden-
tical outcome path as the original machine M¤
j up to ¿ and then induces the agree-
ment z at ¿. We know ¼¿






j is dropped, M¤
j Â M0
j. This contradicts NEMc.
Case B: Player i is the responder at T.
We can show contradiction similarly to Case A above. k
We are now ready to present our ¯rst major result. For any value of complexity
cost, any NEMc outcome that reaches an agreement must do so in the very ¯rst
stage (period 1 or 2) of the negotiation game and hence the associated strategies
must be stationary. The intuition is as follows. The state of each player's machine
occurring in the last period must be distinct. This implies that, if the last period
occurs beyond the ¯rst stage of the game, one of the players must be able to drop
it and instead use another state in his (sub-)machine to condition his behavior in
that period without a®ecting the outcome of the game. This reduces complexity
cost.
Proposition 2 Assume that M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEMc with c ¸ 0 and T(M¤) <
1. Then (i) T(M¤) · 2; and (ii) M¤
1 and M¤
2 are minimal.
Proof. If part (i) of the claim is true, part (ii) must be true because of Lemma
5. Let us consider part (i).
Suppose not. So, suppose that an agreement z 2 42 occurs at some T 2 (2;1).
We know from Lemma 6 that qT
1 and qT
2 are both distinct. Now suppose that player
i is the proposer at T and consider two possible cases.
Case A: x¿ = z at some ¿ < T where i proposes.
Consider another machine M0
i = fM0
ip;M0






ik) which is identical to M¤
i except that:
² qT




² the transition function is such that ¹0
ir(q
T¡1




i ;;) = z and qT
i appears for the ¯rst time at T on the original
outcome path, this new machine (given M¤
j ) generates an identical outcome path
and payo® as the original machine M¤
i . But then, qT
i is dropped and therefore we
have M¤
i Â M0
i. This contradicts NEMc.
Case B: x¿ 6= z 8¿ < T where i proposes.
Consider another machine M0
j = fM0
jp;M0






jk) which is identical to M¤
j except that:
² qT




22² the transition function is such that ¹0
jp(q
T¡1
j ;eT¡1) = qj for some arbitrary
but ¯xed qj 2 Q0
jr; and
² the output function is such that ¸0
jr(qj;z) = Y .
Since the o®er z does not appear anywhere before T on the original outcome
path (when i proposes), the modi¯ed output function does not a®ect the outcome
and payo®. But then, qT




Together with subgame-perfectness requirement (see BW Result 2 above),
Proposition 2 tells us that if there is an agreement in the negotiation game the
outcome must be e±cient. Also, non-emptiness of the set of SPEMc (­±(c)) is
guaranteed (for any ± and any c) if the disagreement game has at least one Nash
equilibrium.
Corollary 2 For any c ¸ 0 and any ± 2 (0;1), if any M¤ 2 ­±(c) is such
that T(M¤) < 1, then M¤ must be e±cient and minimal (implements stationary
strategies). If G has at least one Nash equilibrium, then such SPEMc exists in the
negotiation game.
4.3 Perpetual Disagreement
We now consider SPEMc outcomes in which agreement never occurs. The results
here are sensitive to whether the complexity cost is zero c = 0 (lexicographic
preferences), or positive c > 0.
First, we show that, given any complexity cost and a discount factor arbitrarily
close to one, any SPEMc outcome with perpetual disagreement must be at least
long-run (almost) e±cient; that is, the players must eventually reach a ¯nite period
at which the sum of their continuation payo®s is approximately equal to one.
The argument behind this statement turns critically on the fact that every state
of each player's equilibrium machine must appear on the outcome path (Lemma
1). This implies the following. Suppose that a player deviates from a SPEMc of the
negotiation game by making a di®erent o®er in some period. What can the other
player obtain if he rejects this o®er? Since the state of each player's (sub-)machine
is ¯xed for each period (not each decision node), the ensuing disagreement game
of the period may see an outcome that never happens on the original equilibrium
path; but then, Lemma 1 implies that the subsequent transition must take the
players to some point along the original path for next period. Thus, any punish-
ment for a player who deviates from the proposed equilibrium must itself occur on
the equilibrium path (except for the play of the disagreement game immediately
23after the deviating o®er), and as a consequence, the set of equilibrium outcomes
is severely restricted.
In loose terms, we consider the period in which a player gets his maximum
continuation payo® in the proposer role. Bargaining can then be used by the
other player in the preceding period to break up the on-going disagreement if
there is any (continuation) ine±ciency from then on. In such cases, there exists a
Pareto-improving deviation o®er because the responder in that period, who will
be proposing next, cannot obtain more from punishing the deviant than what he is
already getting from the original outcome as of next period. We need the discount
factor to be su±ciently large so as to eliminate the importance of the current
period in which the deviation is followed immediately by an o®-the-equilibrium
play of the disagreement game.
For the results below,
Proposition 3 For any ² 2 (0;1), 9 ¹ ± < 1 such that, for any ± 2 (¹ ±;1), any c ¸ 0
and any M¤ 2 ­±(c) with T(M¤) = 1, 9 ¿ < 1 such that
P
i ¼¿
i (M¤) > 1 ¡ ².









which is bounded since u(¢) is. De¯ne also




Given these, consider any ± 2 (¹ ±;1) (thus ² > ¯(1 ¡ ±)), any c ¸ 0 and any
M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) 2 ­±(c). As before, let M¤
i = fM¤
ip;M¤







De¯ne ´, tik and ¿´ such that
0 < ´ < ² ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±); (5)
tik = ftj i plays role kg;
and
¿´ = minftj ¼
t




where, as before, ¼t
i is player i's continuation payo® at period t if M¤ is chosen.
Clearly, ¿´ < 1.
Now, take any machine pro¯le (Mi;M¤
j ) and consider i's continuation payo®
after rejecting any o®er in any period belonging to tir. Notice that since
24² every state of M¤









player i's continuation payo® at the next period if he rejects any o®er (given M¤
j )
is at most supt2tip ¼t
i. We know that ¼
¿´
i + ´ > ¼t
i 8t 2 tip.
This implies that under pro¯le M¤ if i receives an o®er (¼max
ir ;1 ¡ ¼max













he must always accept because of the subgame-perfectness of M¤.









jk). This machine is identical to M¤
j except for the
output function which is such that ¸0
jp(q
¿´¡1
j ;;) = (¼max









j g : (7)
Since i always accepts the o®er ¼max
ir given M¤
j and M0
j di®ers from M¤
j only in
o®ers, it follows that (M¤
i ;M0
j) results in an agreement (¼max
ir ;1 ¡ ¼max
ir ) in period
¿.
We also know by Lemma 3 that ¼¿
i = ¼
¿´¡1
i . Thus, we have
¼
¿




Now, since supa2A ui(a)¡ui(a¿´¡1) · ¯ (where ¯ is given by (4)), we have, by






i · (1 ¡ ±)¯ + ±´ :
Using this, we can write
1 ¡ ¼
max
ir ¸ 1 ¡ (¼
¿
i + (1 ¡ ±)¯ + ±´) : (8)
Since M¤ is a SPEMc it must be that ¼¿
j ¸ 1 ¡ ¼max
ir ; otherwise the deviation





j > 1 ¡ ((1 ¡ ±)¯ + ´) :
But, since by (5) we have ² > (1 ¡ ±)¯ + ´, it follows that at period ¿ < 1, P
i ¼¿
i > 1 ¡ ² as in the claim. k
25Proposition 3 does not however rule out the possibility that we observe ine±-
ciency (in terms of continuation payo®s) early on in the negotiation game.8 Given
any ² > 0 and ± su±ciently close to one, we can write the total equilibrium payo®










¿¡1(1 ¡ ²) (9)
where M¤ indicates the equilibrium machine pro¯le, ut =
P
i ui (at (M¤)), and ¿
is the period in which continuation (¯rst) becomes (almost) e±cient. The limit of
the right-hand side as ² ! 0 and ± ! 1 is not necessarily the e±cient level. The
reason is that as we increase ± we are changing the equilibrium strategy pro¯le
itself, and consequently, ¿ may also increase, that is, it may take longer and longer
to reach the e±cient long-run.9
But, it immediately follows from Proposition 3 that if the structure of the
disagreement game is such that there exists no action pro¯le delivering the e±cient
surplus, the players cannot disagree forever. Then, the results in the previous
section imply that any SPEMc must induce an agreement in the very ¯rst stage
of the game and thus be e±cient (and stationary). We summarize this below.
Corollary 3 If
P
i ui(a) < 1 8a 2 A, then 9 ¹ ± 2 (0;1) such that, for any ± 2
(¹ ±;1) and any c ¸ 0, every M¤ 2 ­±(c) is e±cient (and stationary) with T(M¤) ·
2.
Agreement will strictly dominate any disagreement if playing the disagreement
game involves some cost to the players (that bargaining does not). They may, for
instance, discount the time between bargaining and disagreement game within a
period.
In fact, we derive a qualitatively same result from a complexity argument.
If complexity cost is strictly positive, i.e. c > 0, disagreement cannot persist
inde¯nitely however small that complexity cost is, and thus, any SPEMc of the
negotiation game ends in the ¯rst stage and is e±cient.
Proposition 4 For any c 2 (0;1), 9 ¹ ± < 1 such that, for any ± 2 (¹ ±;1), every
M¤ 2 ­±(c) is e±cient (and stationary) with T(M¤) · 2.
8To be precise, neither does it rule out the possibility that there will be ine±cient disagree-
ment game outcomes even after ¿. It is just that the continuation game from then on is almost
e±cient.
9If we restrict each player's machine to use only a ¯nite number of states, then any machine
pro¯le must generate cycles. But this is not enough to guarantee that Proposition 3 implies ex
ante e±ciency in the limit. For this, we need for instance to additionally assume that the size
of a machine is uniformly bounded so that the ¯rst cycle cannot last beyond a ¯xed period.
26Proof. We shall prove the claim by way of contradiction.
Fix any c 2 (0;1).10 De¯ne ¹ ± = 1¡ c
¯ where ¯ is given by (4) above. Given these,
consider any ± 2 (¹ ±;1), and any M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) 2 ­±(c). Suppose T(M¤) = 1.
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 3 above, de¯ne ´ such that
0 < ´ < c ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±) : (10)
De¯ne as before
tik = ftj i plays role kg;
¿´ = minftj ¼
t





















j for some t < ¿´. But then, we have ¼t
i = ¼
¿´
i by Lemma 3. This
contradicts the de¯nition of ¿´.
Next, consider j using another machine M0
j = fM0
jp;M0






jk). This machine is identical to M¤
j except that:
² (similarly to the deviation in the proof of the previous proposition) the
output function is such that ¸0
jp(q
¿´¡1
j ;;) = (¼max
ir ;1 ¡ ¼max
ir ) (where ¼max
ir is
de¯ned by (6) with ´ now given by (10) above); and additionally
² q
¿´





As in the proof of Proposition 3, such deviation results in an acceptance and
would end the negotiation game at ¿. By (11), dropping q
¿´
j does not a®ect the out-
come path up to ¿. By the same argument as in the proof of previous Proposition,
j's deviation payo® here is given by (8) above:
1 ¡ ¼
max
ir ¸ 1 ¡ (¼
¿
i + (1 ¡ ±)¯ + ±´) :
We know that 1 ¡ ¼¿
i ¸ ¼¿
j. Thus, j's loss from such deviation is such that
¼
¿
j ¡ (1 ¡ ¼
max
ir ) · (1 ¡ ±)¯ + ±´ : (12)
10The case of c ¸ 1 is trivial because then complexity cost (weakly) dominates any feasible
average payo® for each player in the negotiation game and thus any equilibrium machine must
be minimal. We can refer to BW Result 2 for SPEMc characterization in this case.
27But the new machine M0




dropped) which means that the deviation also results in a saving on complexity
cost by c > 0. Since we ¯xed c > (1 ¡ ±)¯ + ´ and ± < 1, we have
¼
¿
j ¡ (1 ¡ ¼
max
ir ) < c
implying that the deviation is in fact pro¯table. (More precisely, this implies that
M¤
j is not a c-best response to M¤
i .) This contradicts the proposed SPEMc. There-
fore, T(M¤) < 1. But then, we know from Proposition 2 that T(M¤) · 2 and
from Corollary 2 that M¤ is e±cient. k
5 An Alternative Machine Speci¯cation
Since each stage game of the negotiation game has a sequential structure, we
can have alternative machine speci¯cations that employ more frequent transitions
and hence account for ¯ner partitions of histories and continuation strategies.
Let us present a machine which consists of four sub-machines. This machine will
sometimes be referred to as 4SM.
De¯nition 9 (Four sub-machine (4SM) speci¯cation) A machine,
Mi = f ~ Mip;Mip; ~ Mir;Mirg, consists of four sub-machines ~ Mik = ( ~ Qik; ~ q1
ik; ~ ¸ik; ~ ¹ik)
and Mik = (Qik;q1
ik;¸ik;¹ik) for k = p;r. Each sub-machine consists of a set of
states, an initial state, an output function and a transition function such that,
8~ qik 2 ~ Qik, 8qik 2 Qik, 8xi;xj 2 42, and 8a 2 A,









¹ip(qip;a) 2 ~ Qir;
~ ¹ir(~ qir;x
j;N) 2 Qir;
¹ir(qir;a) 2 ~ Qip :
28This machine maintains the role distinction and makes transition twice within
each period - once after the bargaining and once after the disagreement game.11
As a notational convention, we shall use ~ qi to denote a state used by a sub-machine
that plays the bargaining part of the negotiation game to distinguish it from qi, a
state associated with a sub-machine that plays the disagreement game.
As before Ht
ik(= Ht
jl) refers to the set of t-period histories. Here, we also denote
the set of all possible histories at a disagreement game of period t in which i plays
role k as ~ Ht
ik = Ht




A minimal machine in the 4SM speci¯cation corresponds to an alternative
notion of stationarity. It implements a strategy fi such that
² fi(h) = fi(h0) 8h;h0 2 H1
ip and 8h;h0 2 ~ H1
ik (k = p;r); and
² fi(h;xj) = fi(h0;xj) 8h;h0 2 H1
ir , 8xj 2 42.
The de¯nition of complexity captured by the size of a machine in the 4SM
speci¯cation also needs to be modi¯ed. The size of a 4SM is measured by the
cardinality
P
k j ~ Qikj +
P
k jQikj. De¯ne Fik(fi) = ffijh : h 2 H1
ik g as before and
introduce ~ Fik(fi) = ffijh : h 2 ~ H1
ik g to indicate the set of continuation strategies
at a disagreement game of period t when i plays role k. It is straightforward to




k j ~ Fik(fi)j
corresponds to the size of the smallest 4SM implementing fi.
Given this foundation, analyzing the machine game in the 4SM speci¯cation
is analogous to the previous 2SM case (though a little more cumbersome expo-
sitionally). Any NEMc pro¯le in 4SM must be by de¯nition a Nash equilibrium
of the underlying negotiation game and every state belonging to an equilibrium
4SM must appear on the equilibrium path (Lemma 1).
The following three Lemmas correspond to Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 respectively.
(We omit some of the proofs.) Note that while the game is being played bargaining
alone does not generate any payo®s. Thus, ¼t
i(¢) equally represents i's continuation
payo® at every subgame within the period (on the equilibrium path).
Lemma 7 Assume that M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEMc in the 4SM speci¯cation with





















j)) 8¿ < T(M
¤)
11We can also construct a machine in which transition occurs at each decision node of the
stage game. Six sub-machines will then be required (some of which will in fact serve only to
make transition and not output). There are several other ways to divide each stage. But we
conjecture that as long as we keep the role distinction for the bargaining part the central results





j) are the machines that are identical to M¤
j except that
they start with the sub-machine which operates in the bargaining and disagree-






Lemma 8 Assume that M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEMc in the 4SM speci¯cation with
c ¸ 0. Then, 8i;j and 8t;t0 · T(M¤), we have the following:
if ~ q
t













Lemma 9 Assume that M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEMc in the 4SM speci¯cation with
c ¸ 0. Then, for any i and any ¿ · T(M¤), we have the following:
(i) if ~ q
¿
i (M
¤) 6= ~ q
t
i(M
¤) 8t < ¿; then ~ q
¿
j(M
¤) 6= ~ q
t
j(M













¤) 8t < ¿ :
Proof. (i) Suppose not. So, there exists some ¿ · T such that ~ q¿
i 6= ~ qt
i 8t < ¿
and ~ q¿
j = ~ q¿0








irg where, for k = p;r, ~ M¤










But then, consider i using another machine M0





for k = p;r, ~ M0










is identical to M¤
i except that:
² ~ q¿
i is dropped; and
² the transition function is such that ¹il(q
¿¡1
ik ;e¿¡1) = ~ q¿0
i (k 2 fp;rg).
Since ~ q¿
i 6= ~ qt
i 8t < ¿, this preserves the outcome path up to ¿ ¡1 while making
the path between ¿0 and ¿ ¡1 repeat from ¿ on. Similarly to the proof of Lemma




i. We thus have a contradiction against NEMc.
(ii) This part can be proven similarly to (i) above. k
Using these Lemmas, it is straightforward to extend the agreement results in
Section 4.2 to the 4SM case. If a NEMc outcome under this alternative speci¯-
cation ends at some ¯nite period, the pair of states occurring in the last period
must be distinct. (Notice that the sub-machines used for playing the disagreement
game will not be operating in the ¯nal period.)
Lemma 10 Assume that M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEMc in the 4SM speci¯cation
with c ¸ 0 and T(M¤) < 1. Then, ~ qt
i 6= ~ qT
i 8t < T and 8i.
30Proof. Suppose not. So, suppose that ~ qt
i = ~ qT
i for some i and some t < T. Let
z = (z1;z2) 2 42 be the agreement at T. There are two possible cases to consider.
Case A: Player i is the proposer at T.
De¯ne ¿ = minftj~ qt
i = ~ qT
i g. By Lemma 8, ¼¿
j = ¼T
j : Since there is an agreement
on z at T, we have ¼¿
j = zj.
Now consider player j using another machine M0





where, for k = p;r, ~ M0










machine is identical to M¤
j except that:
² ~ q¿
j is dropped (i.e. ~ Q0
jr = ~ Q¤
jrnq¿
j); and
² the transition function is such that ¹0
jp(q
¿¡1
j ;e¿¡1) = ~ qT
j .
Since, by Lemma 9, ~ q¿
j (as does ~ q¿
i by de¯nition) appears for the ¯rst time at ¿
on the original equilibrium path, this new machine (given M¤
i ) generates an iden-
tical outcome path as the original machine M¤
j up to ¿ and then induces the agree-
ment z at ¿. We know ¼¿





But since ~ q¿
j is dropped, M¤
j Â M0
j. This contradicts NEMc.
Case B: Player i is the responder at T.
We can show contradiction similarly to Case A above. k
Again, this implies that the agreement must occur within the ¯rst stage of the
game; otherwise the states in the ¯nal period can be \replaced" thereby yielding
a saving on complexity cost. (We shall omit the proof of the following result. It is
almost identical to that of Proposition 2.)
Proposition 5 If M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEMc in the 4SM speci¯cation with c ¸ 0
and T(M¤) < 1, then (i) T(M¤) · 2; (ii) M¤
1 and M¤
2 are minimal; and thus
M¤ is e±cient.
What we gain from using this alternative machine speci¯cation is in the case of
perpetual disagreement. Speci¯cally, the SPEMc results in Section 4.3 no longer
depend on the discount factor. Let ~ ­±(c) denote the set of SPEMc in 4SM given
discount factor ± and complexity cost c.
Proposition 6 Consider any c ¸ 0, any ± 2 (0;1), and any M¤ 2 ~ ­±(c) such
that T(M¤) = 1. Then, for any ² > 0, 9 ¿ < 1 such that
P
i ¼¿
i (M¤) > 1 ¡ ².
31Proof . Fix any ². Consider any c ¸ 0, any ± 2 (0;1), and any M¤ =
(M¤
1;M¤
2) 2 ­±(c) such that T(M¤) = 1. As before, let M¤





where, for k = p;r, ~ M¤









De¯ne ´ such that 0 < ´ < ². De¯ne also
tik = ftj i plays role kg
and
¿ = minftj ¼
t
i + ´ > ¼
t0
i 8t;t
0 2 tirg :
Notice that, given M¤
j , if j o®ers (¼¿
i + ´;1 ¡ ¼¿
i ¡ ´) 2 42 at any t 2 tir, i
must accept. Since
² every state of M¤
j appears on the equilibrium path of M¤ (Lemma 1)
² now transition also occurs at the end of bargaining within each period
² ¼t
i = maxfi ¼i(fi;M¤
j (qt
j)) 8t (Lemma 7)
(given M¤
j ) the maximum continuation payo® i can obtain if he rejects such o®er
is equal to supt2tir ¼t which is less than ¼¿
i + ´.
Consider now player j using another machine M0





where, for p = k;r, ~ M0










machine is identical to M¤




i + ´;1 ¡ ¼¿
i ¡ ´).
Now, note that ~ q¿
j 6= ~ qt
j 8t < ¿. Otherwise, ¼t
i = ¼¿
i by Lemma 8, which
contradicts the de¯nition of ¿. Thus, (M¤
i ;M0
j) would end the game at ¿.
Since M¤ is a SPEMc, it must be that ¼¿
j ¸ 1 ¡ ¼¿
i ¡ ´, implying that
¼¿
i + ¼¿
j ¸ 1 ¡ ´. But we ¯xed ´ < ², and thus, at ¿ < 1 we have
P
i ¼¿
i > 1 ¡ ²
as in the claim. k
Proposition 7 For any c > 0 and any ± 2 (0;1), every M¤ 2 ~ ­±(c) is e±cient
(and stationary) with T(M¤) · 2.
Proof. Suppose not. So, consider any c > 0, any ± 2 (0;1), and any M¤ 2
~ ­±(c); suppose T(M¤) = 1.
De¯ne ´ such that 0 < ´ < c, and also
tik = ftj i plays role kg
and
¿ = minftj ¼
t





Consider now player j using another machine M0
















This machine is identical to M¤
j except that:
² (similarly to the deviation in the proof of the previous proposition) the
output function ~ ¸0
jp(~ q¿
j;;) = (¼¿
i + ´;1 ¡ ¼¿
i ¡ ´); and additionally
² q¿




First note that we have ~ q¿
j 6= ~ qt
j and q¿
j 6= qt
j 8t < ¿. Otherwise, ¼t
i = ¼¿
i by
Lemma 8, which contradicts the de¯nition of ¿. Thus, dropping q¿
j would not a®ect
the outcome up to ¿ when the deviation would end the game (before reaching the
disagreement game stage of the period).
Since ¼¿
i · 1 ¡ ¼¿
j, j's loss from such deviation cannot be greater than ´. But
the new machine M0
j has one less state than M¤
j and there is also a saving in
complexity cost by c. We ¯xed ´ < c and thus the deviation is pro¯table. This
contradicts the proposed SPEMc; therefore, T(M¤) < 1. It then follows from
Proposition 5 that T(M¤) · 2 and M¤ is e±cient and stationary. k
6 Conclusion
When players care for complexity of a strategy as well as payo®s, the negoti-
ation game can only display equilibria that are e±cient. Thus, complexity and
bargaining together o®er an explanation for co-operation in two-person repeated
interactions.
Independently of complexity cost, discount factor and the choice of machine
speci¯cation, the negotiation game cannot have a NEMc in which an agreement
takes place after delay beyond the ¯rst stage. If an agreement were to be part of
an equilibrium outcome, then it must be so in the very ¯rst stage of the game,
and the associated strategy pro¯le must be stationary. Consequently, any SPEMc
that induces an agreement must be e±cient.
In fact, if complexity cost is strictly positive (and also discount factor is su±-
ciently close to one when we have the two sub-machine speci¯cation) there cannot
be any other type of SPEMc outcome however small that complexity cost is. Thus,
we have a very strong selection result in this case. If complexity cost is zero, and
hence we have lexicographic preferences, it is also possible to have an equilibrium
in which disagreement persists inde¯nitely. But this case still has to be (almost)
33e±cient in the long run. It also follows here that perpetual disagreement cannot
occur in cases where disagreement is strictly dominated by agreement.
There are several channels to further generalize the analysis in this paper.
Especially, we can reinforce the repeated game °avor of the negotiation game
by considering a broader set of payo®s that can be associated with bargaining
and agreement. We can, for instance, let the space of o®ers be some arbitrary
set P ½ R2 such that u(a) µ P for all a 2 A, thereby allowing an o®er to be
any (ine±cient) disagreement game payo® vector as well as a partition of the
maximum surplus available. We conjecture that complexity will still select the
e±cient outcomes in this case.
7 Appendix A: Relegated Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let Mi = fMip;Mirg be implementation of some
strategy fi where Mik = (Qik;q1
ik;¸ik;¹ik) for k = p;r.
First, we show that jQikj ¸ jFik(fi)j 8k.
For any qi 2 Qik and k = p;r, let Mi(qi) = fMik(qi);Milg be the machine that
is identical to Mi except that
² it starts with the sub-machine Mik; and
² Mik = (Qik;qi;¸ik;¹ik).
Note that for every ¹ fi 2 Fik(fi) and k = p;r, there exists some h 2 H1
ik such
that ¹ fi = fijh. Now de¯ne a function ¡ik : Qik ! Fik(fi) such that ¡ik(¹ qi) is the
strategy implemented by Mi(¹ qi) for any ¹ qi 2 Qik. It then follows that for every
¹ fi 2 Fik(fi), there must exist a distinct state ¹ qi 2 Qik such that ¡ik(¹ qi) = ¹ fi.
Simply let ¹ qi = qi(h) (as de¯ned inductively above) where h is the history such
that ¹ fi = fijh.12
Second, we show that there exists a machine implementation of fi which only
uses Fik(fi) and Fil(fi) as the set of states for its sub-machines.
De¯ne ¹ Mi = f ¹ Mip; ¹ Mirg such that, for k = p;r, ¹ Mik = (Fik(fi);f1
ik; ¹ ¸ik; ¹ ¹ik)
where
² f1
ik 2 Fik(fi) is the initial state and if i plays role k at the initial history
then f1
ik = fi;
² for any ¹ fi 2 Fik(fi) and d 2 Dik; ¹ ¸ik( ¹ fi;d) = ¹ fi(;;d) where ; is the empty
history;
12It is critical here that each sub-machine uses its own distinct set of states. Otherwise, a
single state can be used to activate two distinct continuation strategies, one in each role.
34² ¹ ¹ik( ¹ fi;e) = ¹ fijh;e for any h 2 H1
ik and e 2 E.
This machine has
P
k jFik(fi)j states (each k sub-machine with jFik(fi)j states)
and implements fi: k
8 Appendix B: An Alternative Equilibrium Con-
cept
The following de¯nes the general preference ordering over machine pro¯les pro-
posed by Abreu and Rubinstein [1] (AR).
De¯nition 10 Let Âs
i (and »s
i) denote player i's preference ordering over the
set of machines pro¯les. For any pair of machine pro¯les M = (Mi;M¡i) and
M0 = (M0
i;M0
¡i), we have M Âs
i M0 if one of the following holds:




¡i) and jjMijj · jjM
0
ijj




¡i) and jjMijj < jjM
0
ijj :
A Nash equilibrium can then be written in terms of machines that are most
preferred against each other.
De¯nition 11 A machine pro¯le M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) constitutes a Nash equilibrium













The following Lemma extends Lemma 168.2 in Osborne and Rubinstein [15]
(also part (a) of AR's Theorem 1) to the negotiation game. Any NEM must be
such that each player's machine uses an equal number of states, and consequently,
must correspond to a Nash equilibrium of the negotiation game.
Lemma 11 Suppose that A is compact and ui(¢) is continuous for all i. Then, if
M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤












35Proof. Consider machines in the 2SM speci¯cation. (The 4SM case can be
treated similarly.)
Let Sik de¯ne the set of player i's one-period strategies in the extensive form
game that he plays in role k 2 fp;rg every other period of the negotiation game.
We denote its element by sik 2 Sik. With slight abuse of notation, let ui(sik;sjl)
denote player i's (one-period) payo® given the pair of strategies.
(i) Fix player j's machine Mj = fMjp;Mjrg where, for k = p;r, Mjk =
(Qjk;q1
jk;¸jk;¹jk). Then, suppose that player i solves his dynamic optimization














j is de¯ned inductively as before (by the transition functions of j's ma-
chine).
This is a (deterministic) Markovian problem with the transition of states given
by the other player's machine, and therefore, i's optimal action(s) in each period
depends at most on the state of the other player's machine and the partial history
within the period. (For ¯nite state space, this statement is established by the
Blackwell's theorem. For a general (countable) state space, the case we consider
in the paper, see Hinderer [12] and the references therein. Also, such solution exists
if Sip and Sir are compact (which is true if A is compact) and ui(¢) is continuous.)
Let s¤
ik(q;d) denote the optimal action for player i in role k given q 2 Qjl and
d 2 Dik.
Now, consider a machine for player i Mi = fMip;Mirg de¯ned by, for k = p;r,




² ¸ik(q;d) = s¤
ik(q;d) 8q 2 Qik and 8d 2 Dik; and
² ¹ik(q;e) = ¹jl(q;e) 8e 2 E.
This machine solves the maximization problem (13) above using only the states
used by the other player's machine.
Thus, if M¤ = (M¤
1;M¤
2) is a NEM pro¯le, then jjM¤
i jj · jjM¤




(ii) This follows from part (i). k
Lemma 11 connects our notion of NEMc (De¯nition 7) with AR's equilibrium
notion (De¯nition 11). E®ectively, both de¯nitions take the set of Nash equilibria
36of the negotiation game and select outcomes that capture some measure of \trade-
o®" between payo®s and complexity. In this sense, the equilibrium notions used
in this paper closely parallel those of AR.
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